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APPELLATE JUSTICE 
BUREAUCRACY AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 
William M. Richman* and William L. Reynolds** 
Many of the other Articles in this Symposium demonstrate 
that a single great piece of legal scholarship can have an enor-
mous impact on the development of legal doctrine. This Article 
differs in two respects. First, it focuses not on a single seminal 
work, but rather on a developing literature authored by a large 
group of scholars. Second, it attempts to assess the impact of 
that literature not on the growth of legal theory, but on the de-
velopment of a single legal institution-the United States 
Courts of Appeals. 
Recent years have seen a staggering increase in the work of 
the federal circuit courts. Between 1960 and 1986, filings in 
those courts rose from 3899 to 34,292-an increase of more than 
900%.1 During the same period, the number of active circuit 
judgeships increased from 68 to 168.2 This increase, although 
substantial, has been unable to keep pace with the flood of fil-
ings.3 The judges have very little control over these two princi-
pal variables in the appellate productivity equation because 
Congress controls both the jurisdiction of the federal courts and 
the number of judgeships. Accordingly, the courts have sought 
to accommodate the overload by modifying the way in which 
they process appeals. Among the judges' strategies, three stand 
out as most significant: (1) increasing the number of parajudicial 
• Professor of Law, University of Toledo. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1970; 
J.D., University of Maryland, 1975. 
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B., Dartmouth College, 1967; J.D., 
Harvard University, 1970. 
1. 1960 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 68; 1986 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. 
CTS. ANN. REP. 137. 
2. 1960 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 68; 1986 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. 
CTS. ANN. REP. 6. 
3. For a more detailed discussion of the caseload explosion, see R. PosNER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-93 (1985). Not all commentators are convinced that 
there really is a problem. Professor Marc Galanter has suggested that the litigation ex-
plosion is "an item of elite folklore." Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: 
What We Know and Don't Knaw (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Conten-
tious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 64 (1983). Professor Galanter's conclu-
sion is disputed in R. POSNER, supra, at 76. 
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personnel, such as law clerks, staff attorneys, and legal externs; 
(2) decreasing the number of oral arguments; and (3) decreasing 
the number of cases decided in a signed, published opinion. 
Judges, practicing attorneys, and academics have criticized 
these strategies. The critics see in the reforms significant dan-
gers for the legal process, including the risk that courts are being 
transformed from highly visible, collegial bodies of personally in-
volved legal craftsmen into hierarchically structured legal bu-
reaucracies that often render impersonal, anonymous, and non-
precedential justice.• Part I of this essay describes the three 
4. The commentators who have written about the bureaucratization of appellate jus-
tice include: R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 94-129; Edwards, A Judge's View on Justice, 
Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1981) (a response to Vining, in-
fra); Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal 
Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 low A 
L. REV. 871 (1983) (a response to the charge of bureaucratization); Fiss, Bureaucratiza-
tion of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983); Higginbotham, Bureaucracy - The Carci-
noma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 A.LA. L. REV. 261 (1980); Hoffman, The Bureaucratic 
Spectre: Newest Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60 (1982); McCree, Bureau-
cratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (1981); Meyer, Justice, Bu-
reaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 Mn. L. REV. 659 (1983); Posner, Will the 
Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specializa-
tion of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 764-67 (1983); Powell, Are the 
Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.BA. J. 1370 (1982); Vining, Justice, Bu-
reaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248 (1981); Wald, The Problem With the 
Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766 
(1983). 
A related body of commentary discusses the three significant reforms-parajudicial 
personnel, reduction in oral argument, and limited publication-that have contributed to 
bureaucratization in American appellate courts: P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSEN-
BERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT AR-
GUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS (1987); D. MEADOR, APPELLATE 
COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME (1974); J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, 
LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1980); D. STIENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: 
PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND UsE IN THE CouRTS OF APPEALS (1985); Anstead, Selective Pub-
lication: An Alternative to the PCA?, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 189 (1982); Baier, The Law 
Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1973); Beyler, An Appraisal of 
Supreme Court Rule 23, 72 ILL. B.J. 80 (1983); Bird, The Hidden Judiciary, JUDGES' J., 
Winter 1978, at 4; Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23 
UCLA L. REV. 465 (1976); Flanders & Goldman, Screening Practices and the Use of 
Para-Judicial Personnel in a U.S. Court of Appeals: A Study in the Fourth Circuit, 
JusT. SYS. J., Mar. 1975, at 1; Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of 
Equal Justice?, 61 A.BA. J. 1224 (1975); Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: 
The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1980); Kanner, The Unpub-
lished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386 (1973); Meador, Toward 
Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 Mn. L. REV. 732 (1983); Newbern & 
Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REV. 37 (1978); 
Nichols, Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 909 
(1986); Oakley & Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: Tradition and Innovation in 
the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1286 (1979); Render, On 
Unpublished Opinions, 73 KY. L.J. 145 (1984); Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of 
Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. 
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judicial strategies and the scholarly critiques evaluating them. 
Part II considers the concrete but minimal effects the critical 
commentary has had on the courts. Part III suggests reasons 
why the impact has not been more substantial. 
I. THE STRATEGIES AND THE CRITIQUES 
The proliferation of cases has seen a corresponding prolifera-
tion of judicial assistants and of cases decided without oral argu-
ment and published opinion. This section discusses the form and 
impact of those changes. 
A. Parajudicial Personnel 
One obvious way to increase the output of an organization is 
to increase the number of workers. It is not surprising, then, 
that the number of circuit judges has increased steadily over the 
years.5 At some point, however, the law of diminishing returns 
suggests that the creation of more judgeships causes as many 
problems as it solves.6 If more judgeships are added to the indi-
vidual circuits, intra-circuit inconsistency becomes a problem, 
CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981); Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Prece-
dent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in t[ie United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); Schroeder, Judicial Administration and Invisible 
Justice, 11 U. MICH J.L. REF. 322 (1978); Thompson, Mitigating the Damage-One 
Judge and No Judge Appellate Decisions, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 476 (1975); Thompson & 
Oakley, From Information to Opinion in Appellate Courts: How Funny Things Happen 
on the Way Through the Forum, 1986 AR1z. ST. L.J. 1; Ubell, Evolution and Role of 
Appellate Court Central Staff Attorneys, 2 COOLEY L. REV. 157 (1984); Ubell, Report on 
Central Staff Attorneys' Offices in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253 
(1980); Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned From One Hundred Years of the 
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887 (1987); Washy, 
Appellate Delay: An Examination of Possible Remedies, 6 JusT. Svs. J. 325 (1981); Note, 
Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128 
(1977); Comment, A Snake in the Path of. the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publica-
tion Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309 (1977); Hellman, Courting Disaster, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
297 (1986) (Book Review). 
5. In 1960, the number of authorized circuit judgeships was 68. 1960 DIRECTOR Ao-
MIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 68. In 1962, it was increased to 78, then to 88 in 1966, to 97 
in 1968, to 132 in 1979, and to 156 in 1985. 1981 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. 
REP. 185; 1986 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 2. 
6. A committee of the Judicial Conference at one point took the position that a single 
court of appeals should not be allotted more than nine active judgeships. 1964 U.S. Juo. 
CONF. REP. 15. 
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and en bane procedures become unwieldy.7 If new circuits are 
created instead, inter-circuit conflicts multiply, and the Supreme 
Court's ability to resolve them cannot keep pace.8 Finally, crea-
tion of more judgeships decreases both the collegiality of the 
courts and the prestige of the position, thus making the judicial 
profession less attractive to highly qualified candidates. These 
problems have led the circuit courts to develop an alternative 
strategy for augmenting their productive capacity-increasing 
the number of law clerks, legal externs, and staff attorneys. 
1. Law clerks and legal externs- The personal law clerk, or 
"elbow clerk," has been a fixture on the American legal land-
scape for over a century. The practice of employing recent law 
school graduates to serve as research assistants and sounding 
boards began in the 1880's in the Supreme Court and spread to 
the lower federal and state courts.9 By 1930, Congress had sup-
plied each federal circuit judge with a law clerk. 10 A second clerk 
was added in 1970, and a third in 1980.11 In addition to the three 
law clerks, some circuit judges employ "legal externs." They are 
second- and third-year law students who work in judges' cham-
bers in the manner of law clerks and are compensated with law 
school academic credits instead of money. 12 
Several commentators have expressed concern about this 
proliferation of legal assistants within the judges' chambers. One 
danger is overdelegation. None of the commentators charges 
that clerks have taken over the decision-making process,13 but 
they do fear that clerks are performing significant judicial 
7. More judges, of course, means more three-judge panels and thus more opportunity 
for different rulings on the same issue. En bane procedures are designed to resolve such 
inconsistencies, but en bane hearings can be unwieldy in large circuits. For a discussion 
of the difficulties that attend en bane hearings in very large courts, see P. CARRINGTON, D. 
MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 161-63 (1976). For reasons of this kind, 
Congress split the unwieldy Fifth Circuit in 1981 and created the Eleventh Circuit. Act 
of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994. 
8. The inability of the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts among the circuits is one of 
the reasons for the suggestion that a national court of appeals is needed. See U.S. 
COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PRO· 
CEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 16 (1975). 
9. A fine history of the judicial clerkship is contained in J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, 
LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10-35 (1980). A shorter treatment can be found 
in Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1128-37 
(1973). 
10. Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 509, 46 Stat. 774. 
11. Ubell, Report on Central Staff Attorneys' Offices in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253, 256 n.10 (1980). 
12. The practice is discussed in J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 27-29. 
13. See, e.g., Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An 
Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 
768 (1983); Annual Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 
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work. u The traditional model of the law clerk as a research aid 
and a sounding board did not include ghostwriting for the 
judge. 111 To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, one of the reasons for 
the respect enjoyed by judges is that they did their own work.16 
Now, however, it is clear that the clerks are doing much of the 
drafting.17 As Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit observed: 
These 1612 talented lawyers are doing something. They 
are not merely shelving books and shepardizing cita-
tions. . . . They are not making final decisions, but they 
are assuming some of the responsibility that inheres in 
the craft of judging. In one fashion or another we are del-
egating to them some of the things we don't have time to 
do. That is why they are there.18 
The increase in both the number of clerks and in the reliance 
on their work has transformed the role of the circuit judge. As 
the judge's staff increases, more time must be spent interviewing 
candidates, supervising clerks, and editing their work; less time 
is available for reading, writing, and thinking. Furthermore, ju-
dicial collegiality suffers. As the judge's staff becomes larger, she 
necessarily will tend to consult more with her staff and less with 
her colleagues.19 Thus, the judge, once a "solitary craftsman" 
93 F.R.D. 673, 748 (1981) (Remarks of Judge Alvin B. Rubin) [hereinafter Remarks of 
Judge Rubin]. 
14. McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 787 
(1981); Remarks of Judge Rubin, supra note 13, at 748. 
15. Remarks of Judge Rubin, supra note 13, at 748. 
16. C. WYZANSKI, WHEREAS: A JUDGE'S PREMISES 61 (1965) (quoting Justice Brandeis, 
who made this comment about the Supreme Court justices). 
17. The enhanced role of the clerks is revealed in the changing nature of judicial 
opinions. According to Judge Posner, they are longer, less individualistic in style, more 
cautious (string cites abound), and less candid (novelty and imagination are disguised as 
deduction). Paradoxically, Posner also finds them less well researched. Finally, and most 
important, they reveal less of the judge's decisional process and so are less valuable to 
the bench and bar as accurate predictors of how the judge will rule in future cases. R. 
POSNER, supra note 3, at 107-10. 
18. Remarks of Judge Rubin, supra note 13, at 748 (discussing the 1612 staff and 
personal law clerks employed by federal district and circuit judges in 1981). 
19. On the threat to collegiality, the leading treatise on appellate reform suggests 
that: 
Numerous clerks serve to insulate the judges from one another. The larger the 
judge's personal retinue becomes, the greater is the tendency for the judge to 
628 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
and a "collegial arbiter,"20 has become a delegator and an editor. 
2. Central staff attorneys- The courts came to realize that 
appointing more law clerks strained the judges' supervisory ca-
pacities and rapidly reached a point of diminishing returns in 
productivity.21 For more assistance, they have turned instead to 
staff attorneys-legal assistants who work for the court as a 
whole rather than for a single judge.22 One of the most impor-
tant duties of staff attorneys in the federal circuit courts23 is to 
screen cases for degree of difficulty.2• Difficult cases involving 
novel or important issues of law or very complicated facts are 
placed on the oral argument calendar and routed to a panel. 
Easier cases-frivolous appeals or cases readily resolved by the 
application of well-settled law to uncomplicated facts-are 
scheduled for submission on briefs. For each of these easier 
cases, the staff prepares a memorandum to acquaint the judges 
with the relevant law and facts and often prepares a draft opin-
ion as well. 211 
confer with his staff rather than with his judicial colleagues. He may become less 
receptive to peer argument in conference. This kind of relationship between 
peers, which seems to be a probable outcome of the proliferation of personal 
clerks, can be seen in the working of several federal administrative agencies. 
P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 45-46. 
20. Hoffman, The Bureaucratic Spectre: Newest Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICA-
TURE 60, 62 (1982). 
21. Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23 UCLA L. 
REV. 465, 467-78 (1976); Lesinski & Stockmeyer, Prehearing Research and Screening in 
the Michigan Court of Appeals: One Court's Method for Increasing Judicial Productiv-
ity, 26 V AND. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (1973). Further, some judges realized that the use of law 
clerks for preargument research involves a duplication of effort. If each judge on a three 
judge panel uses a law clerk to prepare for argument, the basic legal research is done 
thrice instead of once. Ubell, Evolution and Role of Appellate Court Central Staff At-
torneys, 2 COOLEY L. REV. 157, 159 (1984). 
22. R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 83 (1976); D. 
Meador, Appellate Courts: Staff and Process in the Crisis of Volume 17 (1974). 
23. The early history of central staff goes back to the use of "commissioners" in some 
state systems. More recently, Judge T. John Lesinski of Michigan and Judge Winslow 
Christian of California began making extensive use of staff attorneys in the intermediate 
appellate courts of their states. The United States circuit courts began using staff attor-
neys in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Ubell, supra note 21, at 157-61. 
24. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 48-51; D. MEADOR, 
supra note 22, at 31. 
25. The use of staff attorneys by the circuit courts for screening appeals and drafting 
memoranda and opinions is discussed in Ubell, supra note 11, at 253. 
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Use of staff attorneys for case screening and opinion drafting 
has proved much more controversial than the courts' reliance on 
law clerks. Indeed, one distinguished commentator labelled as 
"cancerous" the growth of the courts' central staffs.26 The dan-
ger of overdelegation of the judicial function is greater with staff 
attorneys than with law clerks. The staff attorney is not hired by 
the individual judge and so owes his loyalty to the court as a 
whole rather than to an individual judge.27 Further, the staff at-
torney works outside the judge's chambers, often in another city, 
and, therefore, is unable to acquire enough of the individual 
judge's outlook and values to function as his alter ego in the 
drafting process.28 Finally, in some courts, staff attorneys hold 
their positions much longer than the traditional one- or two-year 
term of the law clerk; this practice has caused suspicion among 
the bar that there is a "hidden judiciary" upon which the nomi-
nal judiciary relies too heavily. 29 
Critical commentary on central staff has also focused on the 
screening function. Once a case has been identified as routine or 
frivolous by the central staff, it will receive very little considera-
tion by the judges. 30 The volume· of the caseload and the need 
for time to work on "difficult" cases can lead the judges to rub-
ber stamp a disposition proposed by the staff attorney.31 This 
practice leads to the "no judge opinion," excoriated by a number 
of commentators.32 Thus, the most damning critique of central 
staff screening is that it creates the possibility that the real deci-
sion-makers will not be the publicly chosen and accountable 
judges, but rather a group of legal bureaucrats unknown to the 
bar and the public. 33 
26. McCree, supra note 14, at 787. 
27. Posner, supra note 13, at 775. 
28. Id. 
29. Bird, The Hidden Judiciary, JUDGES' J., Winter 1978, at 4, 4-5. Concerns about a 
hidden judiciary prompted one leading scholar to recommend that staff attorneys be 
hired directly out of law school for a one- or two-year term. Hellman, Central Staffs in 
Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 937, 951 
(1980). 
30. Thompson & Oakley, From Information to Opinion in Appellate Courts: How 
Funny Things Happen on the Way Through the Forum, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 21. 
31. Schroeder, Judicial Administration and Invisible Justice, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
322, 330-31 (1973). 
32. The phrase originated with Professor Robert S. Thompson, retired Judge of the 
California Court of Appeal. Thompson, Mitigating the Damage-One Judge and No 
Judge Appellate Decisions, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 476, 476 (1975); see also Bird, supra note 29, 
at 4-5. 
33. See Bird, supra note 29, at 5; Schroeder, supra note 31, at 330. For this reason, 
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (known as the 
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B. Process Efficiency: Reduced Oral Argument and Selective• 
Publication 
Instead of adding to the decision-making machinery, a court 
can attempt to cope with the flood of litigation by reducing the 
resources devoted to deciding each case. A number of expedients 
have been tried in this area, including streamlined appellate pro-
cedures, 34 prehearing settlement conferences,35 and decision by 
oral opinion. 38 Two types of process reform that have received 
particular critical commentary are reduction in oral argument 
and use of unpublished opinions. 
1. Reduced oral argument- We read more quickly than we 
speak. This simple truth lies at the heart of the widespread re-
duction of oral argument in many appellate courts. Many courts 
now decide appeals on what is euphemistically called "submis-
sion";37 appeals are decided on the basis of written briefs unac-
companied by the traditional oral argument. This reduction, en-
tirely judicial in origin,38 was designed to address the appellate 
overload problem, and its use has grown dramatically in recent 
years. In fiscal year 1984, for example, thirty-seven percent of all 
appeals in the federal circuits were terminated on submission. 39 
Hruska Commission) recommended that central staff attorneys not have responsibility 
for screening cases for disposition without oral argument. U.S. CoMM'N ON REVISION OF 
THE FED. CouRT APPELLATE Svs., supra note 8, at 53-54; see also STANDARDS RELATING TO 
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.62, commentary at 98-99 (1977). 
Id. 
The major problem with a central legal staff is that judicial responsibility may 
be diffused among the staff to the detriment of the appellate process. If a court 
employs a central staff, it must be continually alert to the risk of internal 
bureaucratization and guard against any tendency to rely on staff for decisions 
that should be made only by judges personally. 
34. Examples of "streamlining" include fewer and shorter briefs, expedited schedul-
ing, and smaller records. See, e.g., Goldm_an, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An 
Experiment in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1209 (1978) (focusing 
on preargument conferences). The Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP) program is 
also discussed in Rack, Pre-Argument Conferences in the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 15 U. ToL. L. REV. 921 (1984). 
35. See, e.g., Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court ?rehearing Conference-An Em-
pirical Evaluation, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1221 (1979). 
36. This is a common practice in only a few American appellate courts, although it is 
the practice in England. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Pro-
cess, 42 Mo. L. REV. 732, 739-41 (1983). 
37. Submission is a euphemism because the parties generally are told there will be no 
argument. They may submit, but only because there is no choice. 
38. Meador, supra note 36, at 734. 
39. J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: A DESCRIPTION OF 
PROCEDURES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 5 (1985). 
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Six of the circuits now dispense with argument in at least half of 
their cases. "0 
The reduction in oral argument requires the circuits to de-
velop screening procedures to identify the cases to be decided on 
submission; also, many circuits use a different apparatus to de-
cide the submitted cases.41 The benefits derived from these steps 
include the conservation both of judicial resources"2 and of liti-
gants' time and money.° Combining the reduced argument re-
gime with screening procedures and significant staff involvement 
further enhances efficiency. 
Reduced oral argument has been subjected to significant criti-
cism by both academics"' and practicing lawyers. "11 Even many 
judges are uneasy."8 Commentators contend that substantial 
benefits are associated with oral argument"' and that a heavy 
price is exacted when argument is reduced."8 Judge Richard Pos-
ner describes those benefits succinctly: "[T]he value of oral ar-
gument to judges is high. This is not just because it gives the 
judge a chance to ask questions of counsel, . . . but also because 
it provides a period of focused and active judicial consideration 
of the case.""9 A case decided without argument, then; is a case 
decided on the basis of paper alone. Moreover, given the growth 
of the judicial bureaucracy, it is possible that the paper has been 
processed by parajudicial personnel rather than by judges. Argu-
40. J. CECIL & 0. 8TIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION 
OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (1987). 
41. The procedures vary greatly among the circuits. See generally J. CECIL & D. 
STIENSTRA, supra note 39. In some circuits, screening procedures permit judges to decide 
nonargued cases at a single sitting, immediately after reviewing the case and determining 
that it does not warrant an oral argument. The judges save the time that they would 
otherwise spend becoming reacquainted with the facts and issues for a subsequent dispo-
sition of the case. See id. at 3. 
42. There has been little analysis of the supposed benefits of reduction in oral argu-
ment. We do not know of any empirical data that validate the intuitive proposition that 
reduced oral argument saves time. Two careful investigators have concluded that any 
savings in time associated with reduced oral argument "appears to derive substantially 
from the additional resources provided by the staff attorney's office." J. CECIL & D. 
STIENSTRA. supra note 40, at 166. 
43. See Rubin & Ganucheau, Appellate Delay and Cost-An Ancient and Common 
Disease: Is It Intractable?, 42 Mo. L. REv. 752, 761-62 (1983). 
44. See J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, supra note 40, at 10 n.7. 
45. "[L]awyer unhappiness and outright hostility to the cutting off of oral argument 
was apparent from the outset." Meador, supra note 36, at 734. The American Bar Asso-
ciation adopted a resolution in 1974 that urged that oral argument be preserved. See J. 
CECIL & D. STIENSTRA. supra note 40, at 12. 
46. See Meador, supra note 36, at 735 n.16. 
47. Professor Meador likes oral argument so much that he is willing to substitute it 
for written briefs in some cases. See Meador, supra note 36, at 749-51. 
48. See e.g., J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA. supra note 40, at 134-39. 
49. R. POSNER. supra note 3, at 119-20. 
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ment requires the judge to appear before counsel and demon-
strate her own mastery of the case. As one judge has observed, 
after oral argument, "the bar then knows they have looked the 
judge in the eye and that the clerks aren't making the deci-
sion."110 Without oral argument, it is impossible to be sure 
whether the judge has had any input into the decision-making 
process, or indeed, whether she has done more than sign an or-
der prepared by a clerk, a staff attorney, or an extern. Of course, 
a judge can be as unprepared for argument as for any other part 
of the case. At least at argument, however, this lack of prepara-
tion can be exposed. 
Oral argument also serves other ends. It removes the appellate 
judge from the insulating barrier of paper and helps her realize-
that the case involves real people.111 Oral argument helps keep 
the judicial office "a personal one."112 Ideally, the briefs ade-
quately present the litigants' positions for judicial resolution, 
and further argument is unnecessary. In reality, however, that 
ideal is seldom realized, and attorneys use argument to supple-
ment inadequate written materials.113 Argument is also a chance 
to grab the attention of the court, to interest the judges in the 
case, and to change their perceptions of the problem. 
In summary, oral argument increases the judge's personal in-
volvement in the case, makes the judge more accountable to the 
litigants, and increases the litigants' confidence in the appellate 
process. These are benefits that should not be set aside lightly. 
2. Unpublished opinions- The pernicious impact of the in-
creased use of parajudicial personnel and the reduction of oral 
arguments has been exacerbated by recent developments in 
opinion publication. Again, the goal is to ease the work of 
overburdened judges.114 The argument for selective publication 
turns upon the belief that judicial opinions serve two different 
50. J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, supra note 40, at 136-37. 
51. Reflecting on the relative insulation of trial and appellate judges, one U.S. appel-
late judge remarked that "any solemn chump can get away with being an appellate 
judge, but it takes an honest-to-God he-man to be a good trial judge." Magruder, The 
Trials and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1 
(1958). 
52. McCree, supra note 14, at 790. 
53. See id. 
54. When the bar was concentrated among a small number of lawyers at Westmin-
ster, the availability of judicial opinions was not an issue, for those '<>pinions circulated 
freely among the members of the bar. Because the practice of law has expanded both 
geometrically and geographically, however, the need to have access to opinions requires 
that they be accessible readily-that is, that they be published. See generally Reynolds 
& Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Ap-
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functions: (1) a dispute-settling function, which involves cor-
recting lower court error and explaining the result to the parties; 
and (2) a law-making function, which involves construing stat-
utes and constitutions, reshaping precedent, and commenting 
upon legal institutions. H Opinions that serve only the dispute-
settling function have value only to the parties and the lower 
court and need not be published. By not publishing those opin-
ions, it is argued, judges can save considerable time. Because of 
its limited audience and limited purpose, an unpublished opin-
ion need not contain a detailed recitation of the facts, a discus-
sion of every legal issue raised by the parties, or a scholarly re-
view of the governing legal principles and authorities.116 Further 
time savings are possible because the mechanical tasks associ-
ated with publication, such as cite checking and proofreading, 
are unnecessary.117 Finally, limiting publication produces subsidi-
ary benefits to the bench and bar by reducing both the cost of 
acquiring and storing more published volumes of reports and the 
cost of conducting research in a geometrically increasing legal 
library.118 
Many courts that have adopted limited publication programs 
have also adopted rules that sharply curtail or forbid the cita-
tion of unpublished opinions as precedent.119 This curtailment 
grows out of two concerns. The first concern is with fairness 
based on a fear that some litigants, such as the Justice Depart-
ment, will have better access to unpublished opinions than 
others; limiting the use of unpublished opinions as precedent 
eases but does not solve this problem. A no-precedent rule also 
insures that a judge can be confident that an unpublished opin-
ion will not lead to problems later. Hence, the time savings 
promised by limited publication schemes can be realized without 
peals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 575-77 & nn. 6-14 (1981). 
It has never been the practice to publish all opinions even of appellate cases; indeed, 
written English case law originated as the product of lawyers taking notes of what was 
said in courts. See T. PLUCKNE'IT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 268 (5th ed. 
1956). 
55. See Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 
44 s. CAL. L. REV. 901, 910 (1971). 
56. See Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication 
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1167, 
1182-83 (1978). 
57. Id. at 1184. 
58. Id. 
59. 0. STIENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED OISPOSffiONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE 
COURTS OF APPEALS 3, 22-28 (1985). 
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worrying that a careless word might later come back to haunt 
the court. 60 
The possibilities of saving significant amounts of resources led 
the circuit courts to begin limiting the publication of their opin-
ions. Neither the Federal Judicial Center nor the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, however, has made definitive rec-
ommendations concerning the publication of opinions. Instead, 
each circuit has promulgated its own plan for determining when 
opinions should be published, whether they may be cited, and 
whether they may be used as precedent.61 The plans vary quite 
widely in the way they address those questions. 
Limited publication of judicial opinions has met with substan-
tial criticism from commentators,62 who have raised a number of 
objections to the practice.63 The most strident attack has been 
directed at the diminished quality of the courts' products. One 
study found that in nine of the eleven circuits, at least twenty 
percent of the unpublished opinions failed to satisfy a very un-
demanding definition of minimum standards; in three circuits, 
sixty percent of the opinions failed to satisfy minimum 
standards. 64 
A second critique focuses on the disproportionately frequent 
use of unpublished opinions in certain types of cases, especially 
in civil rights cases, Social Security cases, cases involving pris-
oner petitions,611 and cases where the appeal was filed in forma 
pauperis.68 The heavy concentration of unpublished opinions in 
those areas certainly gives rise to an appearance of a double 
standard of justice. 
60. Of course, a court might use the opinion to buttress a later decision. That is 
unlikely to happen under a no-precedent regime because the unpublished decision can-
not be used as support unless the court flouts its own rules. 
61. The history is discussed in more detail in Reynolds & Richman, supra note 56, at 
1168-72. 
Many state courts have followed a similar pattern. In Ohio, the question of publication 
was left entirely up to the courts. Led by an intermediate appellate judge, reformers 
convinced the Ohio Supreme Court to adopt rules that set forth standards for publica-
tion and citation. See generally Reynolds & Richman, The Supreme Court Rules for the 
Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1985). 
62. A partial bibliography is found in Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54, at 573 n.3. 
See also D. STIENSTRA, supra note 59, at 2 n.3. 
63. Few critics believe that all opinions should be published. Almost all, however, 
believe that the current system needs substantial reform. Our own proposals are set forth 
in Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54, at 626-30. 
64. Id. at 602 table 10. An opinion satisfied "minimum standards if it gave some 
indication of what the case was about and some statement of the reasons for the deci-
sion." Id. at 601 n.75. 
65. Id. at 622 table 14. 
66. Id. at 622. 
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Commentators have also pointed out that unpublished opin-
ions reduce judicial accountability by making the decision-mak-
ing process less public, and hence less visible. Visibility is criti-
cal if judicial performance is to be evaluated. An unpublished 
opinion can hide many problems ranging from laziness to incom-
petence to venality. Of course, it is possible that no such prob-
lem exists. Unless the judges make themselves and their crafts-
manship publicly accessible, however, it is difficult to tell. 
The use of unpublished opinions also makes intermediate ap-
pellate courts less accountable to reviewing courts. Because an 
unpublished disposition makes no "law," a reviewing court with 
discretionary jurisdiction does not have to accept review to cor-
rect a bad precedent. Moreover, congestion at the top of the ju-
dicial pyramid makes it unlikely that review will be granted in a 
case that lacks systemwide impact. Finally, because unpublished 
opinions are typically less thorough and elaborate than reported 
decisions, it is more difficult for a reviewing court to understand 
exactly what was done below. As a result, an unpublished opin-
ion is less likely to draw the critical attention of that court. 
Another line of attack contends that limited publication may 
undermine the rule of stare decisis. Because little attention is 
paid to the law and facts involved in an unpublished opinion, 
the court may miss out on the opportunity to create or modify 
precedent in an area that may well need it. The court may not 
realize that the seemingly routine case before it, if decided in a 
thoughtful and published opinion, would contribute to the body 
of available precedent. Further, a cursory unpublished opinion 
does not demand much mental effort from the judge. She need 
not analyze the problem at the depth that would be required to 
produce a fully reasoned opinion.67 That kind of attention might 
have led to the conclusion that the case did have the potential 
for generating a law-making opinion. Thus, an early decision 
that a case does not warrant a published precedential opinion 
may be self-fulfilling. 
Finally, the scholarly attack has focused on the premises un-
derlying the limited publication regime. In the first place, the 
very limited empirical data do not demonstrate that time can be 
saved by not publishing opinions.68 "Any opinion, published or 
unpublished, will set forth the relevant facts and explain why 
the case is governed by the precedents favoring the government 
67. See McCree, supra note 14, at 790-91. 
68. See Beyler, An Appraisal of Supreme Court Rule 23, 72 ILL. B.J. 80, 85 (1983); 
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54, at 604-06. 
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... or vice versa. The degree of care necessary to bring this ex-
planation up to publication standards should not be great."89 
There is also no evidence demonstrating that attorneys save 
time by having to research fewer decisions. In the absence of 
statistical evidence, one could just as readily assume that a 
greater body of precedent would facilitate the research process. 
More case law might make finding a case on point easier and less 
time consuming, thereby reducing the need to reason by 
analogy.70 
II. EFFECTS OF THE CRITICAL COMMENTARY 
The appellate streamlining devices have worked major 
changes in staff and process in the circuit courts. Those changes 
have been subject to considerable scrutiny and criticism. This 
Part considers the rather minimal impact the critics have had on 
the courts. 
A. Parajudicial Personnel 
The commentary critical of the judges' reliance on parajudicial 
personnel has had three different kinds of effects. First, it has 
prompted some judges to defend publicly the practice of relying 
on law clerks. Judge Harry Edwards of the District of Columbia 
Circuit has responded to the suggestion that judges rely too 
heavily upon the opinion drafts of their law clerks by explaining 
how opinions are drafted in his chambers: 
It is absolutely clear to me and to my clerks that no 
opinion leaves my chambers until I personally have com-
pleted work on a written product that satisfies my own 
standards. Every detail of my opinions must conform to 
my thinking and preferred methods of expression. Al-
69. Hellman, Courting Disaster (Book Review), 39 STAN. L. REV. 297, 301 (1986); see 
also Wald, Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under 
Challenge?, 42 Mn. L. REV. 766, 782 (1983) ("A minimum opinion need not be unduly 
time consuming to write."). 
70. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 123. Judge Wald dissents on this point. See Wald, 
Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law 
Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 904 (1987). 
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though my clerks labor tirelessly to assist me in this 
work, they and I know that the final product is mine. 71 
637 
Judge George Edwards of the Sixth Circuit views clerks in 
much the same way: · 
Law clerks are the most obvious aid to time-pressed 
appellate judges. I use the two which the federal govern-
ment now allows me to save time in every way I can 
think of consistent with judicial duty. But no law clerk 
has ever-or will ever-write an opinion for me. And I 
likewise reject the incorporation in an opinion of lan-
guage from any law clerk memorandum. If I write a sen-
tence I know for certain what I mean. If I copy a sen-
tence, I am by no means so sure. And I believe lawyers 
and litigants are entitled to judicial opinions.72 
A second development, probably a result of the commentators' 
criticisms, is the proliferation of empirical and descriptive stud-
ies of courts' use of central staff attorneys. The Commission on 
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System considered the 
subject,73 and the Federal Judicial Center sponsored three stud-
ies, one in 1974,74 one in 1978,75 and one in 1980.76 Each study 
concluded that the use of staff attorneys helped the circuit 
courts deal with the increasing volume of appeals without sacri-
ficing the fundamental imperatives of appellate justice. 77 Profes-
sor Arthur Hellman conducted the most intensive study of a 
court's use of central staff when he served as the Supervising 
Staff Attorney for the Ninth Circuit from December 1977 
through August 1978. He reorganized the court's central staff 
and concluded that improper delegation of the judicial function 
can be avoided if: (1) each judge of a three-judge panel has equal 
71. Edwards, A Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. 
L. REv. 259, 266 (1981); see also Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bu-
reaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Ap-
propriate Remedies, 68 lowA L. REV. 871, 884-90 (1983). 
72. Edwards, The Avoidance of Appellate Delay, 52 F.R.D. 61, 68 (1970). 
73. See U.S. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE Svs., supra note 8 at 
53-54. 
74. Flanders & Goldman, Screening Practices and the Use of Para-Judicial Person-
nel in a U.S. Court of Appeals: A Study in the Fourth Circuit, JusT. Svs. J., Mar. 1975, 
at 1. 
75. R. BANTA, CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
(1978). 
76. Ubell, supra note 11. 
77. See R. BANTA, supra note 75, at 5; Flanders & Goldman, supra note 74, at 13-14; 
Ubell, supra note 11, at 307. 
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responsibility for every appeal on which he sits until the case is 
assigned for drafting of the opinion; (2) every case decided on 
the merits is discussed at a conference; (3) the staff does not 
draft opinions until the judges have considered the case; and ( 4) 
the court employs recent law school graduates for one- or two-
year periods rather than hiring more senior lawyers who serve as 
career staff attorneys. 78 
A third and more concrete development was also due in part 
to the commentary critical of the burgeoning bureaucracy of 
parajudicial officials in the circuit courts. The Judicial Confer-
ence adopted guidelines limiting the number of central staff at-
torneys in a circuit to the number of active judgeships author-
ized for that court.79 Congress later ratified that limitation.80 
B. Process Reform 
Criticism of process reform has had an even less significant 
effect on judicial behavior. Despite a fair amount of unease 
among the judges concerning the reduction in oral argument and 
the increase in unpublished opinions, silence has been the only 
real response to the critics. Although both trends have been the 
subject of rule making and elaborate studies, there has been no 
retreat. 
1. Oral argument-One response to concerns about reduced 
oral argument has been the development of procedures to regu-
late the process while achieving efficiency and fairness. Today, 
almost all circuits have developed procedures for identifying 
78. Hellman, supra note 29, at 998-1003. Hellman believes that the danger of 
overdelegation is greater if the staff is composed of career attorneys whom the judges 
have come to know and trust. He also suggests that a recent graduate is likely to perceive 
difficulties or questions in the law that a more seasoned attorney would regard as settled 
matters. Id. at 1002-03. 
79. 1981 U.S. Juo. CoNF. REP. 69. The Conference adopted the guidelines after a re-
port by the Committee on Court Administration chaired by Judge Elmo B. Hunter. The 
guidelines seem to have originated as a response to Congressional concern, which in turn 
may have been caused by critical commentary. Reports from the Appropriations Com-
mittees of each house expressed the expectation that authorization of a third law clerk 
for each active circuit judge would remove the need for staff attorneys. The reports re-
quested a study of the question by the Judicial Conference. See S. REP. No. 251, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1979); H. REP. No. 247, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1979). Pursuant to 
these congressional requests, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts as-
signed Judicial Fellow Donald Ubell to make the requested study. Ubell concluded that 
the staff attorney positions could not be eliminated without creating an increased back-
log in the circuit courts. See Ubell, supra note 11, at 307-09. 
80. 28 u.s.c. § 715 (1982). 
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cases not to be argued. 81 There are also protocols in most cir-
cuits that describe judicial responsibilities in this area.82 
The Federal Judicial Center has also sponsored two studies of 
reduced oral argument. The first describes the various proce-
dures used by the courts.83 The second, an exhaustive and intel-
ligent evaluation of the work of four circuits, provides the first 
systematic report of the practice. 8' Because it concludes that 
there is general judicial acceptance of current procedures, this 
report is not likely to spark any change. 
Thus, large-scale reduction of oral argument seems to be a 
permanent alteration of our appellate landscape. It is not hard 
to see why, for it combines the promise of efficiency with ease of 
disposition. Moreover, the reduction reduces judicial contact 
with the routine and unexciting case. The judge can devote the 
greater part of her energy to the cases where that involvement 
will be rewarded, and her support staff can handle the routine 
matters. One judge captured this point nicely when he said that 
"even if there were no caseload pressures, there still would be a 
place for the [screening program] to get the junk out of the sys-
tem."H For these reasons, there has been no movement to re-
store· oral argument to its former glory. The clock is not likely to 
be turned back. 
2. Unpublished opinions- Scholarly analysis of selective 
publication has been overwhelmingly critical. Even some judges 
have joined the chorus. 86 Nevertheless, the flood of unpublished 
opinions continues unabated. 67 
Again, there have been studies and rules. The Federal Judicial 
Center sponsored a study of the entire process a decade ago88 
and recently released a report on the problem of unequal access 
81. See generally J. CECIL & D. S'l'lENSTRA, supra note 39. The two exceptions are the 
D.C. and Second Circuits, which hear arguments in most cases. Id. at 7. 
82. See id. at 33 table 4. 
83. J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, supra note 39. 
84. J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, supra note 40. 
85. Id. at 136 (quoting anonymously a judge interviewed as a part of the study). 
86. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 124. But see, e.g., Anstead, Selective Publi-
cation: An Alternative to the PCA?, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 189 (1982); Nichols, Selective 
Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 909 (1986). 
87. The current nonpublication rate is around 50%. D. STIENSTRA, supra note 59, at 
40 table 2. The situation in the states is even worse. Kentucky's intermediate appellate 
court published about 10% of its opinions in the early 1980's. Render, On Unpublished 
Opinions, 73 Kv. L.J. 145, 145 n.4 (1984). Ohio's intermediate court published less than 
5% of its opinions. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 56, at 316 n.24. The figure has been 
declining dramatically in recent years. The Illinois intermediate appellate court publica-
tion rate fell from 72% to 46% in civil cases between 1980 and 1982. Beyler, supra note 
68, at 82. 
88. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54. 
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to unpublished opinions.89 Although those reports made specific 
recommendations for change, they have had little impact. 
The courts have also engaged in rule making. Each circuit has 
adopted Publication Plans of varying scope and level of general-
ity. Those Plans have been in effect for more than a decade with 
little change.90 The absence of revision is not surprising, for the 
available evidence suggests that the judges pay but scant atten-
tion to the content of the Plans. 91 Once the "paper rule" is in 
place, judges seem to feel that no more attention need be paid to 
the problem. 
As is the case with the reduction of oral argument, the wide-
spread use of selective publication is here to stay. Again, in spite 
of judicial disquiet and academic and professional discontent, 
there is not likely to be significant change. 
III. THE FAILURE OF CRITICISM 
The preceding section has described the relatively minimal ef-
fects of the substantial body of scholarship critical of the 
streamlining procedures of the courts of appeals. Commentators 
have clearly identified significant costs that these devices have 
imposed on the judicial process-more bureaucracy, less ac-
countability, and a dramatic reduction in the visibility of jus-
tice.92 Yet the criticism seems to have had very little effect-at 
least if effect is measured by changes in judicial behavior. The 
percentage of terminations without oral argument has increased 
rather than decreased during the last ten years-the period 
89. D. STIENSTRA, supra note 59. 
90. There have been a few changes in the circuits' opinion publication rules that ap-
pear to be responsive to critical commentary. Several circuits have changed their rules to 
permit citation of unpublished opinions. See 5TH Cm R. 47.5.3; 6TH CIR. R. 24(b); 11TH 
CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE (pursuant to 11TH CIR. R. 36-1). Interestingly 
enough, one circuit changed its rule in the opposite direction and now, with certain ex-
ceptions, forbids citation of unpublished opinions. 10TH CIR. R. 36.3. Three judges dis-
sented publicly from this decision, citing several commentators critical of no-citation 
rules. See 10TH CIR. R. app. III (Holloway, C.J., joined by Barrett and Baldork, JJ., con-
curring and dissenting in the Rules). In apparent response to a suggested model rule in 
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54, at 626-28, two circuits have amended their rules to 
provide for publication of opinions that reverse the decision below or that are accompa-
nied by a separate dissenting or concurring opinion. See 5TH Cm. R. 47.5; 6TH CIR. R. 
24(a). 
91. See generally Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54. 
92. See, e.g., J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, supra note 40, at 133-68. 
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when the critics have been most active.93 Similarly, nonpublica-
tion rates remain high. Finally, reliance upon parajudicial per-
sonnel increased radically during the 1970's, although it appears 
to have stabilized in this decade. 94 
On initial examination, this lack of significant change is sur-
prising. First, it is very difficult to believe that the appellate 
judges have been unaware of the critiques; many have been pub-
lished in prestigious journals with high circulation. Occasionally, 
papers have been published by the Federal Judicial Center and 
distributed to all federal judges. Second, the volume of criticism 
has been relatively large, and articles criticizing the appellate 
streamlining devices outnumber those defending them. Indeed, 
some of the judges themselves have joined the attack. Third, the 
critics' arguments, directed as they are to the traditional goal of 
common-law judging-considered decisions by accountable 
judges explained in reasoned opinions-are not the sort of aca-
demic carping that can be dismissed cavalierly by the courts. 
Why then has there been so little result from so much scholar-
ship? From the judges' point of view, the critics might appear to 
be ivory tower scholars out of touch with the urgent demands of 
steadily increasing caseloads. Law professors typically teach 
fewer than eight hours per week. Given this leisure of the theory 
class, the judges might find academic criticism of caseload 
streamlining devices hypocritical. Moreover, judges, like every-
one else, dislike criticism, are defensive about it, and resist 
changing in response to it. 
We believe, however, that the major reasons for the lack of 
significant effect are quite different. The principal causes for the 
judges' reluctance to abandon or curtail the streamlining strate-
gies are: (1) their perceptions of the quality as well as the quan-
tity of their caseload; (2) their pre-judicial status, work styles, 
and conceptions of appellate judging; and (3) the comforting il-
lusion that the streamlining strategies permit. These explana-
tions tell us much about the nature of judging in late twentieth-
century America. 
93. Compare 1976 DIRECTOR AnMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 161 (2558 cases out of 
8660, or 29.5%, decided without oral argument) with 1986 DIRECTOR AnMIN. OFF. U.S. 
CTs. ANN. REP. 103 (8306 cases out of 18,199, or 45.6%, decided without oral argument). 
94. In 1980, the number of clerks per circuit judge stabilized at three. See supra note 
11 and accompanying text. In 1981, the Judicial Conference of the United States limited 
the number of staff attorneys in a circuit court to the number of authorized judgeships, 
and Congress later ratified that limitation. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying 
text. 
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A. Quantity and Quality 
The cumulative effect of the three streamlining strategies has 
been to create different levels of judicial involvement, and per-
haps different classes of justice, within the mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Some cases, the most interest-
ing or notorious, will benefit from intense judicial involvement. 
The judges will hear full oral argument, confer with their col-
leagues, prepare (with the aid of law clerks) and circulate draft 
opinions, and, finally, produce a published precedential opinion. 
Other cases get very different treatment. The judges will not 
hear oral argument, and they may or may not confer. The opin-
ion, unpublished and non-precedential, will be prepared by a 
member of a staff of young attorneys generally attached not to a 
single judge but to the court itself, and often working in a city 
hundreds of miles away from the judges on the panel. Because of 
this bifurcation, the circuit courts have come to resemble certio-
rari courts. 911 The appeal of right guaranteed by statute seems to 
guarantee only a review by staff working under judicial supervi-
sion. Traditional appellate review is reserved for only a select 
portion of the entire caseload. 
The present bifurcation is not a necessary result of increasing 
caseloads. Judges do not have to lavish attention on one class of 
cases and spend little of their own time and effort on another. 
They might, for instance, cope with increased caseloads by re-
ducing proportionately the amount of time spent on each case. 
Their collective choice of one time-saving strategy rather than 
another is dictated by their perceptions of the great differences 
in quality among appellate cases.96 Some cases-the ones that 
demand new law, require the interpretation of federal statutes 
and constitutional provisions, or implicate significant or contro-
versial economic and social problems-deserve more attention. 
Other cases-hopeless appeals prosecuted by criminal defen-
dants or prison inmates who have no disincentive to appeal, and 
routine appeals of monotonous Social Security administrative 
decisions-warrant less judicial time and effort. 97 That these 
95. For an earlier suggestion that the circuit courts are becoming certiorari courts, 
see Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54, at 625. 
96. See Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195, 195 
(1972); COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR 
APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 2-3, 5 (1973). 
97. The law-and-economics scholars have adopted a sophisticated variation on this 
argument. They contend that although recent changes in appellate procedures are costly, 
they are worthwhile because they help the justice system work more efficiently. A more 
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perceptions exist is shown both by the arguments in favor of the 
streamlining devices and the disproportionate application of the 
time-saving devices to certain types of cases.98 The judges' per-
ceptions may be correct and their reactions to the perceptions 
understandable, but the bifurcated system is inconsistent with 
our stated goals of equal access to justice and the traditional role 
of our courts as the last refuge for society's dispossessed. 
B. Pre-judicial Status, Work Style, and Perceptions of 
Appellate Justice 
Judges' pre-judicial professional status and work styles also 
help to explain their relative satisfaction with the bifurcated 
system of appellate justice in the courts of appeals. Circuit 
judges are not recruited from among the ranks of the young, in-
experienced, or undistinguished. Before an attorney warrants se-
rious consideration for a circuit judgeship, she will have gener-
ated an impressive record of achievement in private practice, 
public service, or law teaching, as well as academic success. Such 
attorneys ordinarily do not deal with trivial, repetitive legal 
problems. Their talents and time are too valuable. If they did 
practice in an area where repetitive and routine problems 
predominate (and most probably did not), subordi-
nates-secretaries, paralegals, and younger attorneys-handled 
the monotony and the details. Their own time and energy were 
devoted to the challenging or momentous cases and to the super-
vision of their staffs or assistants. Thus, the pre-judicial careers 
of the judges prepare them to accept their roles in the new, bi-
furcated model of appellate judging. In the words of Judge Pos-
ner, the judges "were supervisors in practice, and they slip easily 
into the role of being judicial supervisors."99 
efficient system, in turn, will dispense more (better?) justice to more litigants. See New-
man, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 40 REC. A.B. CITY 
N.Y. 12, 33 (1985); Varat, Book Review, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 649, 655 (1986). A more attrac-
tive system will also attract better judges, which, in turn, will further increase the quality 
of justice. R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 116. This avowedly utilitarian argument not only 
lacks empirical verification, but it also grossly distorts a fundamental precept of our legal 
process: that each case should be determined on its own merits, and that no individual's 
suit should be sacrificed for notions of expediency. 
98. Nonpublication of judicial opinions is higher in prisoner civil rights, Social Secur-
ity, and postconviction remedy cases than in other types of litigation. Similarly, appeals 
filed in forma pauperis generate higher nonpublication rates than other appeals. See 
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 54, at 621-23. 
99. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 105. One commentator suggests that the circuit judge, 
supervising a staff of two secretaries and three clerks (and perhaps some legal externs), 
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Another factor of perhaps even greater significance is the 
judges' ideal conception of appellate justice, an image that per-
meates our entire legal culture. According to the traditional 
model, appellate justice involves careful briefing and nimble oral 
argument from counsel. From the judges, the classical paradigm 
requires study of the briefs and the record, close attention and 
questioning during oral argument, collegial sharing and testing 
of ideas in conference, research and drafting (with the help of 
law clerks) of proposed opinions, circulation of draft opinions to 
other members of the panel, and publication of a final opinion to 
be used as precedent by the bench and bar.100 The great jurists 
that our legal culture remembers and reveres are the judges who 
lived this ideal-Cardozo, Holmes, Hand, Friendly-judges 
whose opinions are reproduced in the casebooks and dissected in 
the law reviews. The professional life suggested by the ideal 
model is intellectually challenging and brings the rewards of 
peer respect and craft-satisfaction. Given current caseloads, the 
modern appellate judge simply cannot aspire to the ideal for the 
whole of the docket. The streamlining devices, however, by mini-
mizing judicial involvement with one portion of the docket, per-
mit the judges to approximate the revered and satisfying ideal in 
the remainder. Thus, paradoxically, the desire to emulate the 
great judges of our tradition, surely one of the reasons why able 
attorneys aspire to the bench in the first place, provides a pow-
erful motive for judges to accept the modern bifurcated model of 
appellate justice. 
C. A Cherished Illusion 
Another reason that may account for the judges' relative satis-
faction with the streamlining strategies is that the strategies 
permit the judges, the Congress, and the bar to maintain a cher-
ished illusion-that high quality appellate justice is available 
equally to all litigants in the federal system. Formally, of course, 
there is ample access to the courts. Civil rights statutes,1°1 post-
has become the "judicial equivalent of the managing partner of a small law firm." Hoff-
man, supra note 20, at 62; see also R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 105. 
100. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 14-16. The 
authors title this short subsection of their book: "The Appellate Process When Leisure 
Prevails." 
101. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The accompanying jurisdictional provision is 28 
u.s.c. § 1343 (1982). 
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conviction remedies, 102 in forma pauperis rules, 103 provisions for 
appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants at every 
stage of the case, 10" and mandatory jurisdiction of the courts of 
appeals106 all proclaim the willingness of the federal courts to 
hear the claims of those who feel aggrieved yet lack the re-
sources usually required to gain access to the system. The access 
provided to many such litigants, however, is not access to the 
traditional model of appellate justice, but rather to the second-
class, bureaucratic model. 
Further, the pronouncements of access are pious and for-
mal-federal statutes and revered Supreme Court deci-
sions-and the deprivation of access is subtle and hidden-local 
rules and internal operating procedures of the circuit courts. 
Thus, most of us can maintain the cherished illusion that there 
is enough high quality appellate justice to go around. The illu-
sion is comforting but pernicious, for it obscures a fundamental 
question concerning the distribution of society's dispute resolu-
tion resources. It may be quite sensible, in light of all the com-
peting demands on limited societal resources, to restrict access 
to the circuit courts to litigants whose claims meet some test of 
monetary amount, societal interest, or legal merit; but surely if 
that strategy makes sense, we should adopt it publicly. It makes 
no sense to permit the public pronouncements of access to coex-
ist with the actual practice of restriction. Surely the right thing 
to do with a fundamental question about the distribution of ac-
cess to our courts is not to hide it. Our legal system justly prides 
itself on the maxim that the law is no respecter of persons. Each 
person's legal rights are unique. Our law redounds with recog-
nized claims of offbeat and despised groups, a truth that is one 
of the great glories of American Law. Reforms in appellate ad-
ministration that sacrifice that basic ideal should not be under-
taken lightly. 
102. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (1982). 
103. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982). 
104. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) 
(right to counsel on appeal). 
105. Congress has provided for jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals from all 
final decisions of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). 
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The scholarly critiques of the appellate streamlining proce-
dures used by the circuit courts have demonstrated that those 
procedures pose a serious threat to the legal process. Neverthe-
less, the criticism has produced little significant change in judi-
cial behavior. The relative failure of the critics tells us a great 
deal about the limits on the effectiveness of legal scholarship. 
Scholarly criticism of the practices of a legal institution is un-
likely to produce significant change as long as those practices fill 
the needs of the most powerful actors in the institution. The les-
son, although humbling for the scholars, should not come as a 
great surprise. 
